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Rural-to-Urban Migration, Human Capital, and Agglomeration 
 
Abstract 
 
A new general-equilibrium model that links together rural-to-urban migration, the 
externality effect of the average level of human capital, and agglomeration economies 
shows that in developing countries, unrestricted rural-to-urban migration reduces the 
average income of both rural and urban dwellers in equilibrium. Various measures 
aimed at curtailing rural-to-urban migration by unskilled workers can lead to a Pareto 
improvement for both the urban and rural dwellers. In addition, the government can 
raise social welfare by reducing the migration of skilled workers to the city. Moreover, 
without a restriction on rural-to-urban migration, a government’s efforts to increase 
educational expenditure and thereby the number of skilled workers may not increase 
wage rates in the rural or urban areas.  
 
 
 
Migracja ze wsi do miasta, kapitał ludzki i aglomeracje 
 
Abstrakt 
 
Na podstawie nowego modelu równowagi ogólnej, łączącego migrację ze wsi do 
miasta, efekty zewnętrzne związane ze średnim poziomem kapitału ludzkiego oraz 
gospodarkę aglomeracji, autorzy wykazują, że w krajach rozwijających się 
nieograniczony, niekontrolowany napływ ze wsi do miast pociąga za sobą spadek 
dochodów zarówno mieszkańców miast, jak i wsi. Poprawę (w sensie Pareto) sytuacji 
mieszkańców miast i wsi można osiągnąć stosując różne środki ograniczania napływu 
pracowników ze wsi do miast. Ponadto, rząd może poprawić dobrobyt społeczny 
ograniczając migrację pracowników wykwalifikowanych do miast. Co więcej, jeśli 
migracje ze wsi do miasta nie zostaną ograniczone, wysiłki rządu mające na celu 
podniesienie liczby pracowników wykształconych poprzez zwiększenie nakładów na 
wydatki edukacyjne mogą nie pociągnąć za sobą wzrostu płac ani w regionach 
miejskich, ani wiejskich. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, a new model of rural-to-urban migration is developed, with an 
emphasis on the role of human capital in both urban and rural economic activities. 
Notable exceptions notwithstanding, a substantial literature on rural-to-urban 
migration has taken its cue from the dual economy model of Harris and Todaro (1970). 
Their model assumes that the urban sector produces manufactured goods using 
(homogeneous) labor and physical capital as factors of production, and that the rural 
sector produces agricultural goods using (homogeneous) labor and land as factors of 
production. The model has been widely used as a basic analytical framework for 
studying rural-to-urban migration in developing countries, and as a platform for policy 
formation. 
 
However, since the Harris and Todaro model ignores human capital as a factor 
of production, it appears to have become increasingly less applicable to many 
developing countries in modern times. For example, due to continuing structural 
changes in recent decades, cities in the developing world have become more oriented 
toward service and (relatively) high-tech industries. Also, with a growing share of 
manufactured goods becoming standardized, these goods can be produced anywhere 
that offers basic infrastructure such as piped water and reliable electricity. 
Consequently, the production of manufactured goods increasingly takes place in the 
rural areas of developing countries.1 This realignment enhances the importance of 
human capital in the rural areas. For example, Taylor and Yunez-Naude (2000) find 
that in rural Mexico, the returns from schooling are high both in crop and noncrop 
activities; as schooling levels increase, the returns from schooling arise from activities 
other than crop production. In China, the township and village enterprises (TVEs) have 
played a significant role in the country’s economic growth since the early eighties. In 
2000, for example, TVEs accounted for 47 percent of the total industrial output in 
China (Fu and Balasubramanyam, 2003), and the output value of TVEs has been far 
greater than the output value of agriculture. Yang and An (2002), and Yang (2004) 
show that education not only increases productivity in the nonagricultural sector in 
                                                 
1 For surveys on the importance in recent decades of the rural non-farm sector for the economies of 
developing countries see Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2001), and Reardon, Berdegué, and Escobar (2001). 
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rural China, but that it also facilitates and encourages the relocation of productive 
inputs from agricultural to nonagricultural pursuits. Jonasson (2007) finds that in rural 
Peru, nonagricultural rural employment is a prerequisite for positive returns to 
education, and that education is rewarded by rural-based nonagricultural work. A 
perception that the rural areas in developing countries are an exclusive domain of 
uneducated peasants who apply physical labor to eke out a living had better be 
discarded. 
 
In this paper we develop a new policy-yielding model of migration in which 
human capital is important in both the urban and rural areas. In line with considerable 
research in urban economics and economic growth, agglomeration economies in the 
cities are built into the model.2 In a simple general-equilibrium framework, our model 
interlinks three key factors: the process of migration from the rural area to the urban 
area, the externality effect of the average level of human capital, and agglomeration 
economies.3  
 
We postulate that a city’s productivity is determined by its average level of 
human capital and by the size of its labor force. The productivity of the rural area is 
determined by its average level of human capital. Right at the outset, the analysis 
yields a rather surprising implication: in developing countries, unrestricted rural-to-
urban migration reduces the average income of both rural and urban dwellers in 
equilibrium. This result implies that although a city attracts all the skilled individuals 
and enjoys the benefit of agglomeration economies (which the rural areas do not), with 
free labor mobility, the city’s productivity is still very low in equilibrium. The intuition 
                                                 
2 Several interesting studies that incorporate agglomeration economies into models of rural-to-urban 
migration (for example, the survey by Abdel-Rahman and Anas (2004)) tend to abstract from the unique 
characteristics of developing countries. 
3 The agglomeration economies of a city have been studied extensively in the urban economics literature 
and, lately, in the economic growth literature (Black and Henderson, 1999a; 1999b; Henderson, 2003). 
There is also a growing awareness of late of the importance of the (positive) externality effect of the 
average level of human capital for a city’s productivity (Black and Henderson, 1999b; Lucas, 2001; 
Glaeser and Saiz, 2004; Moretti, 2004). However, to the best of our knowledge, no attempt has been 
made so far to examine systematically the combined repercussions of rural-to-urban migration, human 
capital spillovers, and agglomeration effects. Shukla and Stark (1990) analyze several policy 
implications of agglomeration economies in the city for rural-to-urban migration. They assume 
homogeneous workers and do not attend to human capital considerations. Bertinelli and Black (2004) 
investigate a model of rural-to-urban migration with congestion costs in the city. They abstract from the 
consideration of agglomeration economies and the contemporaneous externality effect of the average 
level of human capital. 
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underlying this result is quite simple: since the returns to skills are higher in the urban 
areas than in the rural areas, as is typically the case in developing countries, skilled 
workers are likely to concentrate in the cities. Consequently, the wage rate of the 
unskilled workers in the rural areas will be low, which in turn will induce a large 
number of unskilled rural workers to leave for the cities. With free labor mobility, the 
rural-to-urban migration process will come to a halt when the urban and rural wages 
for unskilled workers are equalized: the urban wage will decline continuously with the 
in-migration of unskilled workers which, in turn, will reduce the average level of 
human capital in the city. In other words, unrestricted rural-to-urban migration results 
in a lower wage for unskilled workers in both the urban and rural areas. Furthermore, 
since the wages of skilled and unskilled workers in the urban area are affected by 
common productivity factors, the wage for the skilled workers will be driven to a low 
level by the unrestricted rural-to-urban migration. Thus, our model explains the 
negative consequences of rural-to-urban migration in the developing world, as is 
amply highlighted, for example, in nearly every leading development economics 
textbook (cf. Gillis et al., 1996; Ray, 1998; Todaro, 2000).4  
 
In essence, our results arise from the difference between the private human 
capital and the social returns to human capital, a difference which implies that free 
labor mobility leads to an equilibrium that is not socially optimal. In all countries in 
general, and in developing countries in particular, there is an urban-rural wage gap for 
educated workers.5 Consequently, with free movement of labor, all skilled workers will 
cluster in the urban area, leaving the rural area with an average level of human capital 
that is below the social optimum.  
 
Our analysis yields several interesting policy insights. First, our model shows 
that various measures aimed at curtailing rural-to-urban migration by unskilled 
workers, which include subsidizing the rural sector and restricting rural-to-urban 
migration,6 can lead to a Pareto improvement for both urban and rural dwellers. 
                                                 
4 Moreover, our model applies not only to migration from rural areas to urban areas, but also to 
migration from towns and counties to cities, or even from small cities to large cities. 
5 For example, see McCormick and Wahba (2005), and Naughton (2007). 
6 The policy of restricting rural-to-urban migration has been implemented by a number of developing 
countries and, as noted in Section 3 below, is exemplified by the “Hukou” system in China which 
strictly restricts rural-to-urban migration (Au and Henderson, 2006). 
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Second, and somewhat surprisingly, our analysis shows that the government can raise 
social welfare by reducing the migration of skilled workers into the city and by 
subsidizing some skilled workers to move from the city to the rural areas or, for that 
matter, to stay in the rural areas. Third, our model shows that in developing countries, 
when there is nothing to deter rural-to-urban migration, a government’s effort to 
increase educational expenditures and thereby the number of skilled workers may not 
increase the wage rates in rural or urban areas as long as there are still a large number 
of unskilled workers in the rural area in equilibrium. In fact, a rather perplexing result 
is that as the number of skilled workers (in the city) increases, the average level of 
human capital in the city may very well decrease. 
 
2. The basic analytical framework 
 
In what follows we develop a quite simple model in order to highlight our 
essential ideas. A detailed discussion of the robustness of the model is provided in 
Section 5.  
 
Consider a small open economy that consists of an urban area (the city) and a 
rural area (the countryside). There are two types of workers: skilled and unskilled. 
Efficiency labor is the only factor of production in both the city and the countryside. 
The labor markets in the city and in the countryside are both perfectly competitive. The 
urban sector produces a single good, and the rural sector produces a different single 
good. The aggregate production in the city is according to a constant returns to scale 
production technology 
 
 FnY c =  (1) 
 
where cY  and n are the total output, and the sum total of the efficiency units of labor 
employed in the city, respectively. Akin to Black and Henderson (1999b), we assume 
that F, the productivity factor of the city, is determined by n, the agglomeration effect 
of the city, and by the city’s fraction of skilled labor (the number of skilled workers in 
the city divided by the total number of workers in the city), which is denoted by ch . 
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Namely, we define 
 
 ),( chnfF ≡ . 
We assume that  
 
 ,0),(),( 1 >=∂
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The assumption 0),(1 >chnf  means that there is an agglomeration effect in the 
production in the city. This is a standard assumption in urban and regional economics 
(see, for example, Black and Henderson, 1999a; Henderson, 2003). The assumption 
0),(2 >chnf  means that the production efficiency of the city depends positively on 
the average level of human capital of the city, that is, there is a positive externality 
effect of the average level of human capital (see, for example, Acemoglu, 1996; Black 
and Henderson, 1999b; Lucas, 2001; Glaeser and Saiz, 2004; Moretti, 2004; Liu, 
2007). 
 
Since the economy is a small open economy, the prices of its outputs are 
determined in the world market, and are thus independent of the economy’s outputs. 
We normalize the price of the good produced in the urban sector of the economy to 
one. Since the labor market in the city is perfectly competitive, the wage rate per 
efficiency unit of labor in the city is equal to the marginal product of efficiency labor 
in the city, namely to 
 
),( chnf . 
 
We assume that an unskilled worker is endowed with one unit of efficiency 
labor. Skilled workers are assumed to be homogeneous. We also assume that the 
private returns to human capital are higher (or at least marginally higher) in the city 
than in the countryside.7 Accordingly, we assume that a skilled worker is endowed with 
                                                 
7This assumption is in line with the evidence (see, for example, Schultz (2004), Naughton (2007)), and 
is consistent with the presumption that the returns to an individual’s skills are positively affected by the 
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α units of efficiency labor if he works in the city, and with β units of efficiency labor if 
he works in the countryside, and that 
 
 1>> βα  . (3) 
 
Thus, in the urban area, the earnings of an unskilled worker and the earnings of a 
skilled worker are ),( chnf  and ),( chnfα , respectively. 
 
The aggregate production in the rural sector is according to a constant returns 
to scale production technology 
 
 rr HLY =  (4) 
 
where rY  and rL  are the total output and the sum total of the efficiency units of labor 
employed in the countryside, respectively. In line with the discussion in the 
Introduction, we assume that H, the productivity factor of the rural sector, is 
determined by the fraction of skilled workers in the rural area8, which is denoted by 
rh .9 Namely, we define 
 
 )(1 rhg
P
H =  
 
where P is a positive coefficient, and where we assume that 0)(' >rhg . Thus, the 
average level of human capital is a production factor in both the rural area and the 
urban area, although the private returns to human capital may well be greater in the 
city than in the countryside. However, in line with the received literature, we assume 
                                                                                                                                             
average level of human capital. In fact, in the related theoretical literature such as Bertinelli and Black 
(2004), and Lucas (2004), an extreme assumption is made that the returns to human capital in the rural 
area are zero. 
8 That the wage of an unskilled worker increases with the proportion of skilled workers in the rural area 
can be attributed to the complementarity between skilled and unskilled labor in the rural area, as well as 
to the externality effect of the average level of human capital. 
9 That the wage of an unskilled worker increases with the proportion of skilled workers in the rural area 
can be attributed to the complementarity between skilled and unskilled labor in the rural area, as well as 
to the externality effect of the average level of human capital. 
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that the agglomeration effect exists only in the urban area. 
 
We assume that the price of the good produced in the rural sector is P. Then, 
the value of the marginal product of an efficiency unit labor in the rural area is )( rhg . 
Since the labor market in the rural area is perfectly competitive, the wage rate per 
efficiency unit of labor in the countryside is equal to )( rhg . Thus, in the rural area, the 
earnings of an unskilled worker (that is, the wage for his efficiency unit of labor) and 
the earnings of a skilled labor are )( rhg and )( rhgβ , respectively.  
 
Finally, we assume that all individuals supply their efficiency units of labor 
inelastically. Then, since prices are constant, the indirect utility function of every 
individual is his income. Thus, in this paper we assume that every individual seeks to 
maximize his income.  
 
Consider now unhindered rural-to-urban migration. To concentrate on 
essentials, for most of this paper we do not consider the process of human capital 
formation, taking the numbers of skilled and unskilled workers as exogenously given. 
(This assumption is relaxed, however, in Section 4.2.) We introduce the following 
notations: 
 
cs : the number of skilled workers in the city before migration occurs 
cl : the number of unskilled workers in the city before migration occurs 
rs : the number of skilled workers in the rural area before migration occurs 
rl : the number of unskilled workers in the rural area before migration occurs 
sm : the number of skilled migrants 
lm : the number of unskilled migrants 
 
We first examine the equilibrium conditions when there are no restrictions on 
rural-to-urban migration. The rural-to-urban migration of the unskilled workers ceases 
if and only if the rural wage and the urban wage for unskilled workers are equalized - 
as long as there are unskilled workers in the rural area in equilibrium. That is, if the 
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solution is interior, then the number of unskilled migrants, lm , will be determined by 
the following equation: 
 
 )(),( rc hghnf =  . (5) 
 
From the assumptions in (3), we know that the wages for a skilled labor in the city and 
in the countryside are ),( chnfα  and )( rhgβ , respectively. From (5) and the 
assumptions in (3), we know that 
 
 )()(),( rrc hghghnf βαα >=  (6) 
 
which implies that if there is rural-to-urban migration of both unskilled and skilled 
workers, then all skilled workers will end up in the city, which in turn implies that 
0=rh . Thus, we can rewrite (5) as  
 
 )0(],)([ g
mssl
ssmsslf lrcc
rc
lrcc =+++
++++α . (7) 
 
As an added comment, note that we assume that the following condition is satisfied so 
that not all unskilled workers migrate to the city in equilibrium:  
 
 )0(],)([ g
lssl
sslsslf rrcc
rc
rrcc <+++
++++α . (8) 
 
Since the solution is interior, we must have that rl lm < . Then, clearly, we have the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: Without restrictions on rural-to-urban migration, the wage rates for 
unskilled workers and for skilled workers are, respectively, )0(g  and )0(gα  in 
equilibrium. 
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Note that )0(g  is the lowest possible wage for unskilled workers, and )0(gα is 
the lowest possible wage for skilled workers in the urban area. Thus, Proposition 1 
implies that no matter how strong the agglomeration effect in the urban area, if the city 
cannot absorb all the unskilled workers from the rural area, which is typically the case 
in the developing world, then everyone will end up being poor. In other words, without 
any restrictions on, or barriers to, rural-to-urban migration, the agglomeration effect 
can result in high production efficiency only in a partial equilibrium framework. Our 
general equilibrium framework, however, as simple as it is, shows that the efficiency 
effect of urban agglomeration can be completely diluted by the falling level of average 
human capital in the city resulting from the rural-to-urban migration of unskilled 
workers. As noted in the introduction, this inefficient outcome stems from the 
misallocation of the externality effect of human capital between the rural and urban 
areas, and from the inability of a free market regime to yield efficient outcomes when 
the externality effect of the average level of human capital is important in production. 
This result provides an explanation for the empirical observation that urbanization per 
se may not lead to efficiency gains despite the benefit of agglomeration economies in 
the cities of the developing countries (Gillis et al., 1996; Todaro, 2000; Henderson, 
2003). 
 
3. Restricting rural-to-urban migration can improve social welfare 
 
The market failure identified in Section 2 suggests that the government should 
assume a role in managing the rural-to-urban movement of labor. In this section, we 
will demonstrate that by restricting rural-to-urban migration in various ways, the 
government can improve social welfare. 
 
3.1. Restrictions placed on the migration of the unskilled 
 
In this subsection, we consider only a restriction on the migration of unskilled 
workers. In such a case, all the skilled workers will be in the city. We assume that the 
government chooses lm such as to maximize the output of the entire economy, that is, 
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 )0()(],)([])([ gml
mssl
ssmsslfmssl lrlrcc
rc
lrcclrcc −++++
+++++++ αα . (9) 
 
Since the objective function in (9) is continuous with respect to lm , which in turn 
belongs to the compact set [0, rl ], an optimal solution of lm must exist. Let the 
optimal solution to (9) be denoted by *m . From the assumption in (8), we know that 
*m < rl . Then, if the government can restrict migration by allowing only *m  unskilled 
rural workers into the city, then the urban wage will increase.10 As to the rural 
unskilled workers, their wage rate will still be at the level of g(0), which is their 
equilibrium wage rate without any restrictions on rural-to-urban migration. Thus, a 
restriction of rural-to-urban migration can lead to a Pareto improvement. 
 
In summary, we thus have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: The restriction of rural-to-urban migration of unskilled workers can 
result in a Pareto improvement. 
 
Proposition 2 implies that from the perspective of production efficiency in the 
economy at large, absent restrictions on rural-to-urban migration there are too many 
unskilled migrants. The Proposition provides a rationale for the policies of restricting 
rural-to-urban migration of unskilled workers, which have been implemented by a 
number of developing countries including Indonesia, the Philippines, Tanzania, and in 
particular, China.11  
 
In China, a policy is in effect called the Hukou system. Essentially, this is a 
household registration system. In a way, Hukou is akin to a citizenship in the context 
of international migration: it entitles an individual to free or subsidized housing, 
medical care, children’s education, and other social benefits, but only in a certain 
                                                 
10 Intuitively, we may consider the following scenario: suppose that prior to the incidence of rural-to-
urban migration, the urban wage (for unskilled workers) is higher than the rural wage. If the government 
can impose a restriction that only skilled workers can migrate from the countryside to the city, then the 
urban wage will increase because the migration of the skilled workers into the city will enhance the 
agglomeration effect and raise the average level of human capital in the city.  
11 However, a policy of restricting rural-to-urban migration of only unskilled individuals will result in a 
large urban-rural gap in earnings. Apparently, efficiency and equality do not move in tandem. 
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specific location. Hukou is an effective tool for restricting rural-to-urban migration, 
particularly of unskilled workers (see, for example, Chan and Zhang, 1999; Wu and 
Treiman, 2004; Au and Henderson, 2006). In particular, it is costly for rural individuals 
to migrate to the cities. For example, Au and Henderson (2006, pp. 352-353) write: 
“Permanently leaving a village means abandoning ownership claims without 
compensation to agricultural land that one’s family may have farmed for decades and 
to the profits of local rural industries which are distributed in-kind, as for example with 
township housing. …Migrants may still have to pay taxes to their rural home village 
for services they don’t consume and on land left fallow. …There is a license fee to 
work outside the home township paid to the township that can be equivalent to several 
months’ wages. At the destination there can be fees for city management, for being a 
“foreign” worker, for city construction, for crime fighting, for temporary residence, 
and even for family planning if the migrant is female.”  
 
Proposition 2 suggests an economic rationale for the Hukou system in China. 
Massive rural-to-urban migration will significantly drive down the average human 
capital in the cities, although it enhances the agglomeration economies of the cities. 
Without any restrictions on rural-to-urban migration, the net effect is negative and 
urban productivity will be driven to a low level. The Hukou system may not though 
necessarily lead to an optimal production efficiency in the cities. Yet, it enhances urban 
production efficiency by more than free rural-to-urban migration would. Thus, 
although the Hukou system was largely an outgrowth of political considerations, our 
model shows that it may have significant and surprisingly positive economic benefits. 
 
3.2. Restrictions placed on the migration of the skilled  
 
This subsection shows that if some skilled workers can be held back in the rural 
area (albeit with some financial compensation from the government) then, obviously, 
the proportion of skilled workers in the rural area will be greater than zero, which 
implies that there will be an overall increase in the wage rate, and hence, a possible 
enhancement of social welfare. 
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To establish this possibility rigorously, we denote the proportion of the skilled 
workers that are kept in the rural area by x. Then, with free migration of rural unskilled 
workers, the wage rate for unskilled and skilled workers in the countryside will be, 
respectively, “g(x)” and “βg(x)” in equilibrium; the wage rate for unskilled and skilled 
workers in the city will be, respectively, “g(x)” and “αg(x)”in equilibrium. Thus, total 
output (in the economy at large) will be 
 
 )()]()([ xgmsmsll srscrc −++++ βα . (10) 
 
It is subject to  
 lrsr
sr
mlms
msx −+−
−=  (11) 
and 
 )(],)([ xg
mmsl
msmmslf lscc
sc
lscc =+++
++++α . (12) 
 
The first order condition of (10) with respect to “x” is  
 
 0)(')]()([)()()( ≤−+++++− xgmsmsllxg
dx
md srscrcs βαβα  (13) 
 
with strict equality holding if 0>x . In (13), the expression of 
dx
md s )(  can be obtained 
by totally differentiating (11) and (12) with respect to sm , lm  and x. It is easy to verify 
that if )0('g is sufficiently large, then x=0 cannot satisfy (13), which means that x=0 is 
not the optimal solution.  
 
The preceding discussion leads then to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: If )0('g is sufficiently large, then total output will be larger if some 
skilled workers work in the rural area. 
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Proposition 3 implies that if the cost of tax and transfer that the government 
incurs is sufficiently small relative to )0('g  - the marginal benefit of increasing the 
average level of human capital in the rural area when the level is at zero - then the 
(benevolent) government will find it beneficial to induce some skilled individuals to 
work in the rural area by means of financial compensation. Since human capital is 
increasingly important in the rural areas of many developing countries, when the initial 
level of average human capital is low, the increase in output resulting from some 
skilled individuals working in the rural area will be large, which implies that this 
condition is likely to be satisfied in these countries. Thus, an interesting policy 
implication is that a Pareto improvement can be had if the government were to 
subsidize some skilled labor in the rural areas so that they will not migrate to the city 
or that they will move from the city to the rural areas.12 The presence of a certain 
number of skilled workers in the rural areas may significantly reduce the rural-to-urban 
migration of unskilled workers. 
 
Proposition 3 further implies that without restrictions on migration, there may 
be too many skilled migrants.13 The intuition is that the migration of skilled workers 
from the rural areas is likely to bring in its wake the migration of many more unskilled 
workers, which will reduce the average human capital of the city, and hence the city’s 
productivity.14 The migration of skilled workers from the rural areas will reduce rural 
productivity, which will make the rural areas even less attractive to rural unskilled 
workers. Consequently, the migration of skilled workers can lead to a large number of 
unskilled workers migrating from the rural areas. The common wisdom in the received 
                                                 
12For the United States, an analysis based on data taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of the 
Labor Market Experience 1979 until 1998 (Gould, 2007) suggests that for “white-collar” workers , 
human capital gains acquired from working in the city are transferable to the rural areas. There is no 
evidence that moving to the rural areas wipes out the usefulness of human capital even if acquired in the 
city. Of course the United States’ evidence may be of limited relevance to the setting studied by us, but it 
serves to hint that a “downward” movement from the city to the rural area is not a harbinger of 
inevitable human capital erosion. 
13 In this model, we abstract from the consideration that individuals may have idiosyncratic tastes for 
living in the countryside or in the city. With this additional consideration, whether the implication holds 
will depend on whether there are a sufficiently large number of skilled individuals who prefer to live in 
the countryside due to their idiosyncratic tastes despite the urban-rural skilled wage gap.  
14 It might be argued that if there are few skilled individuals in the countryside, then the (private) returns 
to the skilled in the countryside will be high. But this argument is not supported by evidence. In most 
developing countries, or even developed countries, there is a much larger fraction of skilled workers in 
the city. However, the private returns (the earnings) of the skilled are much higher in the cities. In fact, it 
appears that the less skilled there are in the countryside, the larger the urban-rural gap and the less the 
earnings of both the skilled and the unskilled in the countryside. 
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literature is that in developing countries, while unskilled rural-to-urban migration may 
harm the urban economy, skilled rural-to-urban migration will have a positive effect on 
the urban economy (for example, see McCormick and Wahba (2005)). The common 
wisdom is deficient because it is based on a partial-equilibrium analysis, concentrating 
on the beneficial impact of skilled rural-to-urban migration for the cities, while 
ignoring both the harmful impact of this migration for the rural areas and the harmful 
impact for cities of the subsequent unskilled rural-to-urban migration. Our general-
equilibrium analysis implies that excessive skilled rural-to-urban migration harms the 
urban economy as well. 
 
Again, the Hukou system in China provides a good case study of the benefits of 
restricting rural-to-urban migration in a developing country.15 A fairly unique feature 
of the Chinese economy is its township and village enterprises (TVEs) which, as 
already noted in the Introduction, have played a significant role in China’s growth 
since the early eighties. An important contributing factor for the rapid development of 
TVEs is the plentiful presence of talented and skilled workers in China’s rural areas 
(Fu and Balasubramanyam). And conversely, the development of rural industries 
dampens the incentive of skilled workers to migrate from the rural to the urban areas. 
 
4. Additional policy implications 
 
In this section, we analyze the implications of two policies that have often been 
implemented in many developing countries: (1) subsidy to the rural sector; (2) 
increasing educational expenditures. We assume that labor is freely mobile between the 
rural and the urban areas, that is, that no restrictions are imposed on rural-to-urban 
migration. 
 
                                                 
15 The Hukou system imposes much less stringent migration restrictions on skilled workers than on 
unskilled workers (Wu and Treiman, 2004). Still, there are significant barriers even for a skilled worker 
in rural China to obtain an urban Hukou. Consequently, many skilled workers remain in the rural areas 
of China. 
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4.1. Subsidy to the rural sector  
 
We denote the subsidy to every worker in the rural sector by λ. Then, cf. 
Proposition 1, the net wage rate of every unit of efficiency labor in the rural area will 
rise from g(0) to g(0)+λ. We postulate that the subsidy is financed by taxing the 
workers in the city, and we assume that the tax rate is flat. Then, in equilibrium, the 
following two conditions must be satisfied. 
 
(1) Urban-rural wage equalization 
 
With free labor mobility and perfectly-competitive labor markets, the urban 
wage rate for the unskilled workers must be equal to the rural wage rate for the 
unskilled workers so that there is no further rural-to-urban migration. By logic similar 
to the reasoning of Section 2, all skilled individuals work in the city in equilibrium. 
Thus, with government intervention of tax and subsidy, the equilibrium condition for 
the equalization of the (net) wage rate in the rural and urban areas is 
 
 λατ +=+++
++++− )0(],)([)1( g
mssl
ssmsslf lrcc
rc
lrcc  (14) 
 
where τ denotes the tax rate (per an efficiency of unit labor in the city). 
(2) The government’s budget constraint 
 
Since we study a static model, we assume that the government’s budget must 
be balanced: the total subsidy payments to the rural sector are equal to the total tax 
revenue in the urban sector, that is,  
 
 λαατ )(],)([])([ lrlrcc
rc
lrcclrcc ml
mssl
ssmsslfmssl −=+++
+++++++ . (15) 
 
We now show that the subsidy to the rural sector can lead to a Pareto 
improvement for both urban and rural dwellers. The reasoning is straightforward: with 
the subsidy in place, the net wage rate (that is, the wage rate after the tax and subsidy) 
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for the unskilled workers in both the urban sector and the rural sector in equilibrium 
will increase from g(0) to g(0)+λ. Meanwhile, in equilibrium, the net wage rate for the 
skilled workers (in the urban sector) will increase from αg(0) to α[g(0)+λ]. Thus, the 
subsidy to the rural sector can lead to a strict Pareto improvement for both urban and 
rural dwellers, which unambiguously improves social welfare. 
Next, we examine how the subsidy to the rural sector can be optimally chosen. 
We assume that the government chooses lm such as to maximize the output of the 
entire economy after the imposition of taxes and the disbursement of subsidies. With 
free labor mobility, all the skilled workers will work in the city, by the assumption that 
the returns to their skills are higher in the city. Thus, the total income of the whole 
economy (before the government’s imposition of taxes and disbursement of subsidies) 
is given by (9). Note that the total income after the government’s redistribution is the 
same as the total income before the government’s intervention. Therefore, the 
government will choose lm to maximize the total output of the whole economy (before 
the government’s tax and subsidy), that is, it will choose *mml =  (recall the analysis 
in Section 3.1). Then, by inserting *mml =  into (14) and (15) and solving these two 
simultaneous equations, we obtain the optimal subsidy ( *λ ) and the optimal tax ( *τ ) as 
follows:  
 
 rrcc
r
lssl
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+++
−−=
)(
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ατ  (16) 
 
and 
 
 rrcc
rcc
lssl
msslgf +++
+++−=
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*
*
α
αλ  . (17) 
 
It is easy to ascertain that the tax rate in the city, *τ , is between zero and one and that 
the amount of subsidy per rural unskilled worker, *λ , is between zero and )0(gf − . In 
summary, we have the following proposition. 
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Proposition 4:  
(1) The subsidy to the rural sector can lead to a Pareto improvement for both the 
urban and rural dwellers, which unambiguously improves social welfare. 
(2) The optimal tax and the optimal subsidy given, respectively, by (16) and (17), 
yield an equilibrium number of unskilled migrants that maximizes the output of 
the whole economy. 
 
The underlying logic of Proposition 4 is similar to that of Section 3. The subsidy to 
the rural sector effectively restricts rural-to-urban migration, which in turn mitigates 
the inefficient allocation of the average level of human capital between the rural and 
urban areas. 
 
4.2. Governmental expenditures on education  
 
In this subsection, we denote the total number of skilled, which is now a 
variable, by s. In this new setting we denote by ul  the initial number of unskilled 
workers in the city (before migration occurs), and by m  the number of the unskilled 
rural-to-urban migrants. 
 
We consider the realistic, developing world situation that there will still be 
unskilled in the rural area, no matter how much the government spends on education 
(up to a realistic amount). Then, with free labor mobility in equilibrium, the following 
condition for the urban and rural wage equalization must obtain: 
 
 )0(),( g
msl
smslf u
u =++++α . (18) 
 
Thus, from (18), we can see that with free labor mobility, an increase in educational 
expenditures will not increase the wage rates for the skilled workers and the unskilled 
workers in both the rural and the urban areas. Namely, no matter how large s is (up to a 
certain level so that there are still unskilled workers in the rural area), the wage rate for 
the unskilled workers and the skilled workers will remain constant at the levels of g(0) 
and αg(0), respectively. 
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Now, we denote the fraction of skilled workers in the city by R, namely 
 
 
msl
sR u ++≡  . (19) 
 
It implies that  
 
 s
R
smsl u )1( −+=++ αα  . (20) 
Inserting (19) and (20) into (18), we get 
 
 )0(],)1([ gRs
R
sf =−+ α  . (21) 
 
Totally differentiating (21) with respect to s and R, we get 
 
 
2
2
1
1
2 ])1([
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fRR
ds
dR
−
−+= α  . (22) 
 
Recall that α>1. Then, from (22), we can see that 0<
ds
dR , that is, an increase in the 
total number of skilled workers will result in a lower fraction of skilled workers in the 
city if and only if 
 
 2
2
1 fRsf <  (23) 
 
namely, if and only if  
 
 21
2)( sffmsl u <++ . (24) 
 
In summary, we have the following proposition. 
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Proposition 5:  
(1) With free labor mobility, an increase in governmental expenditures on 
education will not increase the wage rates for skilled or unskilled workers in 
both the rural and urban areas. 
(2) An increase in the total number of skilled workers will result in a lower 
fraction of skilled workers in the city if and only if 21
2)( sffmsl u <++ . 
 
The model shows that without restrictions of (deterrence to) rural-to-urban 
migration, a government’s effort to increase educational expenditures and thereby the 
number of skilled workers will not increase the wage rates in the rural and urban areas 
as long as a large number of unskilled workers remain in the rural area in equilibrium. 
Thus, as the number of skilled workers (in the city) increases, the average human 
capital in the city may decrease. Note that the intuition of Part (2) of Proposition 5 is 
that an increase in s may result in a much greater increase in m , which reduces R. If 
the economic prosperity of a city depends on its average human capital, as emphasized, 
for example, by Lucas (2001), then a rather surprising outcome is that larger 
expenditures on education will result in a lower level of average human capital in the 
city and the same level of average human capital in the countryside, which will thus 
reduce the economic prosperity of the entire economy. Therefore, the proposition 
implies that increasing educational expenditures alone in a developing country may 
yield an inefficient outcome. In other words, in a developing country where unskilled 
workers far outnumber skilled workers, increasing the human capital stock will not in 
and by itself reverse the inefficient allocation of the average human capital between the 
rural and urban areas which is caused, in turn, by unrestricted rural-to-urban migration. 
Consequently, increasing the human capital stock alone may not result in the country’s 
workers experiencing an increase in their wage rates.  
 
An additional comment is called for. Suppose that the government can freely 
decide on its educational expenditures in the rural and urban areas. Then, with free 
rural-to-urban migration, the government will incur educational expenditures only in 
the city if the educational system in the city is more efficient than in the countryside. 
This is so because with free labor mobility, all the skilled workers will end up in the 
city. With a restriction on rural-to-urban migration, however, the government will have 
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a stronger incentive to spend on rural education since it can increase rural wages and 
reduce the migration of the unskilled workers to the city which, as analyzed in Section 
3 will, in turn, increase everyone’s wage rate. 
 
5. Robustness of the Model 
 
The analysis in the preceding sections yields several new results, some of 
which are in sharp contrast to the received literature. Since our analysis is based on a 
simple foundation, one may wonder whether our results depend critically on our 
underlying assumptions. In response to this possible concern we discuss in this section 
the robustness of our results. We show that the fundamental assumption of our model 
is that there is an abundant supply of unskilled labor in the rural areas, an assumption 
which is in line with the prevailing reality in most developing countries.16 We argue 
that the results obtained thus far will qualitatively hold even if our model is extended. 
We consider six extensions: (1) capital is yet another factor of production; (2) there are 
several cities; (3) individuals may have idiosyncratic tastes for living in the 
countryside; (4) there is a congestion cost in the city; (5) the marginal productivity of 
unskilled labor in the rural sector is diminishing; (6) housing prices and rents in the 
urban areas are higher than in the rural areas. 
 
In our model, we have assumed that labor is the only factor of production, and 
that skilled labor and unskilled labor are substitutes in production. If, instead, we were 
to assume that capital too is a factor of production and that skilled and unskilled labor 
are complements in production then, ceteris paribus, the returns to capital and skilled 
labor in the city will increase with increased rural-to-urban migration of unskilled 
labor. However, the returns to both capital and skilled labor also depend on the average 
level of human capital in the city, which declines with the increase in the inflow of 
unskilled labor. The net returns to capital and skilled labor in response to an increase in 
the rural-to-urban migration of unskilled labor will depend then on the magnitude of 
the negative impact on productivity of a declining average level of human capital. In 
                                                 
16 In fact, this assumption is similar to Ricardo’s (1817) argument that at the time of early 
industrialization in many of the nowadays developed countries, there was always a “labor surplus” in the 
rural areas. 
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other words, the greater the impact of the average level of human capital on 
productivity, the more likely the net returns to capital and to skilled labor will decline 
with an increase in the rural-to-urban migration of unskilled labor. 
 
In historical times, such as the period of the Industrial Revolution, production 
was not intensive in sophisticated knowledge, which suggests that the agglomeration 
effect in itself resulted in high productivity, with urbanization positioning the economy 
on a growth path (Goodfriend and McDermott, 1995).17 In that setting, rural-to-urban 
migration of unskilled labor benefited both capitalists and skilled labor (such as 
engineers and entrepreneurs). However, in the current era of knowledge-based 
production, the average level of human capital is a vital determinant of a city’s 
productivity. In this environment, unrestricted rural-to-urban migration is likely to lead 
to a significant reduction in the returns to all factors of production. 
 
Consider next a setting of multiple cities. In such a setting, since the production 
functions in different cities are all likely to be non-linear, the general equilibrium 
framework of this new setting is likely to yield multiple equilibria. However, as long as 
there is a sufficiently abundant supply of unskilled labor in the rural areas, the result 
will continue to hold that in a developing country, the agglomeration effect does not 
bring about high production efficiency in a general equilibrium framework, if labor 
mobility is free. The reason is that if the wage of the unskilled workers in any city is 
higher than the wage of the rural unskilled workers, then there will be an inflow of 
unskilled migrants from the rural area into that city which will result in a steadily 
declining level of average human capital in that city. In equilibrium there will be a 
complete equalization of the wage rate of the unskilled workers in the rural area and in 
that city, and the efficiency effect of urban agglomeration in that city will be 
completely diluted by the unrestricted rural-to-urban migration of unskilled workers. 
By a similar logic, the policy implications of the model will also continue to hold. 
 
                                                 
17 In those times, manufacturing existed only in cities, and the rural areas produced only agricultural 
goods. 
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To concentrate on essentials, our model does not incorporate the possibility that 
some individuals may have idiosyncratic tastes for living in the countryside, which 
could imply that some skilled individuals may choose to accept a lower rural wage in 
order to live in the countryside. In this case, not all the skilled workers will end up in 
the cities. However, it is reasonable to argue that particularly in a poor economy, for 
most people this kind of idiosyncratic taste is not strong in comparison with the lure of 
a higher income. Thus, the essential implication of our model that without government 
intervention too many of both the skilled workers and the unskilled workers are in the 
cities, will materially continue to hold.  
 
Also, in the received literature it is nearly always postulated that the limiting 
factor on migration to the cities is congestion (or commuting costs and pollution). This 
perspective can be conveniently incorporated into our model upon a slight 
modification of an assumption in (2): instead of 0),(1 >hnf  for all n, we could assume 
that 0),(1 >hnf  if n is below a certain level and that 0),(1 <hnf  if n is above a certain 
level. Clearly, such a modification will not qualitatively change any of the model’s 
results. As a matter of fact, this consideration implies that there is a negative 
externality effect of rural-to-urban migration, which in turn implies that restricting 
rural-to-urban migration is even more desirable. In other words, the modification 
would only reinforce the ramifications of our model. 
 
Next, it might be argued that the marginal productivity of unskilled labor in the 
rural sector diminishes, and hence that additional rural-to-urban migration may 
increase rural welfare. However, since there are at least two factors of production in 
the rural sector viz. skilled labor and unskilled labor, these two factors are likely to be 
complementary in production and thus, an increase in skilled labor in the rural sector 
will increase the marginal productivity of unskilled labor in that sector. Consequently, 
restricting the rural-to-urban migration of skilled labor will increase the marginal 
productivity of unskilled labor in the rural sector and thereby could well increase 
welfare in that sector. In other words, a more efficient way of allocating labor might be 
to induce some skilled labor to work in the rural sector, rather than encouraging 
additional rural-to-urban migration of unskilled labor. 
 
  23
Finally, it could be argued that agglomeration in the cities will bring in its wake 
high housing prices which could drive unskilled labor out of the cities. However, this 
argument is inconsistent with the observed reality in most developing countries. Large 
segments of the cities of the developing world consist of shanty towns and poor 
neighborhoods in which the price of housing is very low, even though the price of 
housing in other parts of the cities can be as high as that in the cities of the developed 
world (cf. Todaro, 2000). At least two explanations account for this. First, the presence 
of a large number of unskilled workers in a certain part of a city can well result in a 
low housing price in that part of the city, for example, due to concerns about crime and 
pollution. Second, a great many of the unskilled workers who migrate to the cities in 
the developing world leave their families behind. These migrants typically send much 
(often most) of their (meager) earnings to their families in the rural areas, and their 
demand for housing in the cities is usually quite modest. The shanty towns and poor 
neighborhoods in the cities evolve so as to offer low-quality, cheap, and small housing 
units to cater for this demand. 
 
In conclusion, the results obtained in our simple model appear to be robust to 
an array of possible extensions, as long as the assumption that there is a sufficiently 
abundant supply of unskilled labor in the rural areas holds.18 Since this assumption is 
in line with the prevailing reality of most developing countries but may not be 
reflective of the conditions that obtain in the developed world, we re-emphasize that 
our model applies only to developing countries. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the received theoretical literature hardly attends to the 
subject of rural-to-urban migration in developing countries in modern times. As noted 
in the Introduction, this neglect appears to stem from two interrelated misconceptions: 
that rural areas produce only agricultural goods, and that the efficient production of 
                                                 
18 Recall that this assumption is represented by Inequality (8) when there are no restrictions on labor 
mobility, and when there are no government interventions. 
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manufactured goods can take place only in (large) cities.19 Presumably, it is because of 
these misperceptions that the role of human capital in the production of the rural sector 
is largely ignored in the received theoretical literature. 
 
We have sought to set up a new framework that bridges the gap. We postulate 
that a city’s productivity is determined by its average level of human capital and by the 
size of its labor force. The productivity of the rural area is determined by the average 
level of human capital there. Our analysis yields a rather surprising implication: 
unrestricted rural-to-urban migration reduces the average income of both rural and 
urban dwellers in equilibrium. With free inter-area labor mobility, rural-to-urban 
migration will come to a halt when the urban and rural wages for unskilled workers are 
equalized: the urban wage will fall continuously with the in-migration of unskilled 
workers, which reduces the average level of human capital in the city. Furthermore, 
since the wages of skilled and unskilled workers in the urban area are affected by 
common productivity factors, the wage of the skilled workers will be driven to a low 
level by the unrestricted rural-to-urban migration. Thus, our analysis explains the 
negative consequences of rural-to-urban migration in the developing world. Moreover, 
our analysis yields several interesting policy insights: the analysis reveals that 
measures aimed at curtailing rural-to-urban migration by both unskilled and skilled 
workers can potentially lead to a Pareto improvement for both the urban and rural 
dwellers, and it shows that without restrictions on rural-to-urban migration, increasing 
educational expenditures alone may not increase the wage rates in the rural or urban 
areas. 
 
Models of rural-to-urban migration are at the heart of theories of economic 
development and growth. Ricardo (1817) argued that the urban industrial sector can 
draw away surplus rural labor without causing a rise in wages in either the rural or 
urban areas. Ricardo’s insight was expanded in numerous subsequent writings, 
including the Nobel-Prize winning treatise of Lewis (1955), and the seminal 
contribution of Fei and Ranis (1964). This body of work explains nicely the historical 
demographic transition across regions, as well as the economic development of the 
                                                 
19 In fact, manufacturing activities have become more decentralized even in developed countries, such as 
the USA (Desmet and Fafchamps, 2006). 
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currently-developed countries. Recently, Lucas (2004) has revitalized Ricardo’s 
original insight and developed it further, noting that rural-to-urban migration is 
essentially a process of the transfer of labor from a traditional, land-intensive 
technology to a human capital-intensive technology. 
 
Despite its prominence in the development economics literature, the current 
body of research runs into great difficulties in explaining the consequences of the 
massive rural-to-urban migration flows that have occurred in a great many developing 
countries in the past few decades. Our theory explains the different impacts of rural-to-
urban migration in the past versus nowadays. We posit that the production efficiency of 
a city depends not only on the size of its labor force (the agglomeration effect), but 
also on the average level of human capital of its labor force. In a general equilibrium 
framework, we demonstrate that unrestricted rural-to-urban migration leads to 
inefficiency when the average level of human capital plays a significant role in 
productivity, which might not have been the case in historical times. In the past, 
production was not knowledge intensive, which suggests that it was the agglomeration 
effect in and by itself which resulted in high productivity, with urbanization placing the 
economy on a solid growth path. In the current era of knowledge-intensive production, 
the average level of human capital is a vital factor in the productivity of both the urban 
and rural areas. In this setting, unrestricted rural-to-urban migration in developing 
countries leads to significant negative outcomes for all individuals, in cities and 
countryside alike. 
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